

## A **New** Application of **ML** for **Cybersecurity**: Attack Surface Management

Share in chat – are you into Al, cybersecurity, both, neither?

Pamela Toman Sr. Principal Machine Learning Engineer Cortex Xpanse March 2023

# Cybersecurity is mission + AI ASM is impossible without AI

Al for ASM means solving cool, hard problems





#### Nice to meet you













EXPANSE







**Cybersecurity is mission + AI** 


ASM is impossible without AI

Al for ASM means solving cool, hard problems

4 | © 2022 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. All rights reserved.



#### Bad actors attack everyone all the time



#	Lowercase	Mixed Case	Mixed Case + Numbers
1	0\$	0\$	0\$
2	0\$	0\$	0\$
3	0\$	0\$	0\$
4	0\$	0\$	0\$
5	0\$	0\$	0\$
6	0\$	0\$	0\$
7	0\$	0\$	2\$
8	0\$	6\$	155 \$
9	1\$	315 \$	12,118 \$
10	16 \$	16,391 \$	945,165 \$
11	416 \$	852,312 \$	73.7 M\$
12	10,820 \$	44.3 M\$	6 B\$
13	281,330 \$	2 B\$	449 B\$
14	7.3 M\$	120 B\$	34 T\$
15	190.2 M\$	6.2 T\$	-
16	5 B\$	324 T\$	-
17	129 B\$	-	
18	3.3 T\$	-	-

Security +

ASM

brute forcing passwords is easy <u>turingpoint.de</u>, February 2020

#### Attacks produce money and power




- Sell data
- Hold data for ransom
- Rent the machine
- Mine cryptocurrency
- Drop malware installer
- Download non-public info
- Break infrastructure



#### Security - ASM - AI

#### Increased internet connectedness makes it worse




Advanced search Cheat sheet

☆ 118 ● Shell Updated on Feb 9, 2020





#### Without defense innocent people will fall







#### Security <mark>></mark> ASM **>** .

#### Without defense innocent people will fall

THE CYBERSECURITY 202

The settlement, if approved by a judge, would end a seven-year legal effort to win compensation for more than 21 million current and former federal employees who were victims of the hack of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in

information was intensely personal. It included background check forms that delved into victims' financial and romantic lives as well as Social Security numbers and — in a subset of about 5.6 million cases — fingerprint information.

**OPM victims have faced a number of hurdles, including legal precedents** that **make it difficult or impossible to win compensation** from data breaches that don't **create direct economic loss**. That's a high bar for OPM victims because the breach appears to have been for espionage purposes and there's no definitive evidence any of the stolen data

#### Lawyers are nearing a settlement deal for the infamous 2015 OPM hack

3 🚱

Analysis by Joseph Marks and Aaron Schaffer May 9, 2022 at 7:28 a.m. EDT


Attorneys are closing in on a settlement deal that could deliver up to \$63 million to some victims of one of the most cataclysmic data breaches in history.

The settlement, if approved by a judge, would end a seven-year legal effort to win compensation for more than 21 million current and former federal employees who were victims of the hack of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 2015, which intelligence officials say was almost certainly perpetrated by the Chinese government.

The OPM breach marked a devastating blow to the U.S. government's reputation for cybersecurity and sparked intense anger among many victims — largely because the breached information was intensely personal. It included background check forms that delved into victims' financial and romantic lives as well as Social Security numbers and — in a subset of about 5.6 million cases — fingerprint information.

OPM victims have faced a number of hurdles, including legal precedents that make it difficult or impossible to win compensation from data breaches that don't create direct economic loss. That's a high bar for OPM victims because the breach appears to have been for espionage purposes and there's no definitive evidence any of the stolen data was ever used for cybercrime.





#### Our mission: Know what's there so you can defend it



## **Attack Surface**



# Cybersecurity is mission + Al ASM is impossible without Al

Al for ASM means solving cool, hard problems





#### ASM is impossible without AI

#### Observe

## Attribute

#### Act



#### **Observe:** We need AI to explore IP space & find "what exists"

Brute force search? Not anymore....

IPv4 (32-bit)

34.107.151.202


4,294,967,296



**IPv6** (128-bit)

2607:f8b0:4005:807::200e


340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456



Alderaan explodes... us too...



#### Attribute: We need AI to identify the owner





#### Act: We need AI to make remediation possible

55% of enterprises see more than 10k alerts a day

**79%** of security teams feel **overwhelmed** by the volume of threat alerts

**85%** of security professionals think their security team is **understaffed** 

sources: SC Media via survey at 2018 RSA; analyst report by Enterprise Management Associates; SOC report by Ponemon Institute





#### ASM is impossible without AI

#### Observe

## Attribute

#### Act




Cybersecurity is mission + Al

ASM is impossible without AI

Al for ASM means solving cool, hard problems










#### ML: How should we frame the attribution question?





Security +

#### **Engineering:** How do you attribute ownership at internet scale?

Naively doing inference is too expensive

Direct & indirect field values correctness Every domain/IP/etc. completeness

(\* every organization)



#### MLOps: How do you support the ML development lifecycle?

#### Hidden Technical Debt in Machine Learning Systems

D. Sculley, Gary Holt, Daniel Golovin, Eugene Davydov, Todd Phillips {dsculley, gholt, dgg, edavydov, toddphillips}@google.com Google, Inc.

Dietmar Ebner, Vinay Chaudhary, Michael Young, Jean-François Crespo, Dan Dennison {ebner, vchaudhary, mwyoung, jfcrespo, dennison}@google.com Google, Inc.

#### Abstract

a fantatically powerful toolkit for building useful comquickly. This paper argues it is dangerous to think of ing for free. Using the software engineering framework of it is common to incur massive ongoing maintenance systems. We explore several ML-specific risk factors to lesign. These include boundary crossion, entanglement, indeclared consumers, data dependencies, configuration ternal world, and a variety of system-level anti-patterns.

ommunity continues to accumulate years of experience with live mfortable trend has emerged: developing and deploying ML sysbut maintaining them over time is difficult and expensive.


ed through the lens of *technical deh*, a metaphor introduced by p reason about the long term costs incurred by moving quickly in al deht, there are often sound strategic reasons to take on technical tent. Not all deht needs to be serviced. Technical deht may be naid down.

been row an each state of the second state of

In this paper, we argue that ML systems have a special capacity for incurring technical debt, because they have all of the maintenance probability and the specific issues. This debt may be difficult to detect because it exists at the system level rather than the code level. Traditional abstractions and boardnaries may be subty corrupted or invalidated by the fact that data influences ML system behavior. Typical methods for paying down code level technical debt are not sufficient to address ML-specific technical debt at the system level.

This paper does not offer novel ML algorithms, but instead seeks to increase the community's awareness of the difficult tradeoffs that must be considered in practice over the long term. We focus on system-level interactions and interfaces as an area where ML technical debt may rapidly accumulate. At a system-level, and ML model may silently erode abartaction boundness. The tempting re-use or chaining of input signals may unintentionally couple otherwise disjoint systems. ML packages may be treated as blackboose, resulting in large masses of "gue code" or calibration layers that can lock in assumptions. Changes in the external world may influence system behavior in unintended ways. Even monitoring ML system behavior may prove difficult without careful design.

In this paper, we argue that ML systems have a special capacity for incurring technical debt, because they have all of the maintenance problems of traditional code plus an additional set of ML-specific issues. This debt may be difficult to detect because it exists at the *system* level rather than the code level. Traditional abstractions and boundaries may be subtly corrupted or invalidated by the fact that data influences ML system behavior. Typical methods for paying down code level technical debt are not sufficient to address ML-specific technical debt at the system level.



probability

"Data Slices" paper in Neurlps '21 Data-Centric Al workshop





Who owns what on the internet?

ML Francisco establistico

Framing the question

**Engineering** Scaling the answer

**MLOps** Supporting the lifecycle **Ethics** Monitoring the effects

Security > ASM

## **Drilling out on Palo Alto Networks**




Our leadership drives innovation

# "We're driving an Al-based SOC transformation."

– CEO Nikesh Arora in the 23 February 2023 earnings call




#### We have the data, scope & customers to build big





#### Our whole organization is solving cool, hard problems





Zero-day blocking



Correct configuration





Malware identification







# Thank you

#### Happy to answer questions!



Pamela Toman 🛛 🎧 Sr. Principal Machine Learning Engineer Cortex Xpanse

ptoman@paloaltonetworks.com

paloaltonetworks.com

